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Abstract
This paper examines theoretically the impact of host intellectual property rights (IPR) protection
and complexity on MNEs’ investment decision to the South in order to explain why large amount of
foreign direct investment (FDI) flows to low IPR protecting China and other emerging economies.
There are two key assumptions, imitation cost are positively related to complexity and imitation
cost is higher when imitating a product designed only for foreign market than those for host market.
In the model, a strengthening of IPR protection in the South raises an MNE’s profit and stimulates
inward FDI and licensing simultaneously, and stronger IPR protection will also induce more higher
complexity production transfered to the South. Furthermore, as cost-oriented FDI is less sensitive
to host IPR protection, developing host countries with low IPR protection can attract relatively
more cost-oriented FDI. The model implies that strengthening of IPR protection can help emerging
economies attract more complex and market-oriented FDI.
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1 Introduction
Two features of the process of globalization in the last few decades are most remarkable, one is the
growing fragmentation of production and the other the expansion of multinational firms’ organization on
a global scale. Firms allocate their operation worldwide to exploit cross-country differences in production
costs or access foreign market. Existing literature shows that market size, labor cost, infrastructure,
trade barrier, market structure, institutional quality and other local advantages of host country are key
determinations of a multinational firm (MNE) investing abroad. One important institutional dimension is
intellectual property rights (IPR) protection, which may have strong impact on firm’s overseas investment
decision, firm performance, technology transfer and host country industrial development (Branstetter et
al., 2005[2]; Khoury and Peng, 2011[18]; Branstetter et al., 2011[4]; Smith, 2001[29]; Helpman, 1993[15]
and Javorcik, 2004[17]).
In last two decades, a large amount of foreign direct investment (FDI) flowed into emerging and
developing economies. As shown in Figure 1, only 25 percent of FDI in average flowed to developing
economies in 1970s and 1980s, this figure is up to 32.5 in 1990s and the first decade of the 21th century.
Over 20% in of these FDI in last two decades flowed to China, one of the largest emerging market in
the world. In 2011, about 124 billion US dollars of FDI flowed into China, 44% of all flowed into BRICS
economies (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) (see Figure 2). From early 1990s, firms in
developing economies paid a large amount of royalty and license fee to foreign firms. Figure 3 shows the
royalty and license fees paid by BRICS firms. Chinese firms are most outstanding, they paid more than
13 billion current US dollars in 2009, much more than the sum of the other four economies (less than
12.3 billion US dollars).
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Figure 2: FDI flowed into BRICs economies
Taking low labor cost and large emerging market into account, it is still confusing to see large amount
of FDI flowing into the emerging economies, especially China, while the IPR protection remains very
weak there. The effect of IPR protection on FDI are widely discussed theoretically and empirically.
Javorcik (2004)[17] finds that a weak IPR regime deters foreign investment in high technology sectors
where intellectual property rights play an important role. It also shifts the focus of FDI projects from
manufacturing to distribution. Theoretically, the relationship between IPR protection and FDI is quite
ambiguous. On the one hand, a weak IPR protection increases the probability of imitation, which makes
a host country a less attractive location for foreign investors. On the other hand, strong protection
may shift the preference of multinational corporations from FDI towards licensing. So the effect of
IPR protection on FDI flow maybe determined by the substitution effect between FDI and licensing.
Using an aggregate data set of 50 countries, Smith (2001)[29] finds that the effect of IPR on licensing is
larger than those on export and FDI, but Puttitanun (2007)[28] using a larger disaggregated industry
level dataset (provided by the Bureau of Economic Analysis, BEA) concludes that an increase in IPR
results in a higher probability of FDI than does licensing. Also, the importance of IPR protection varies
between industries. Using survey data, Mansfield (1994[19], 1995[20]) finds that the concern about the
IPR regime also depends on the purpose of an investment project, being the highest in the case of R&D
facilities and the lowest for projects focusing exclusively on sales and distribution. Nunnenkamp and
Spatz (2003)[27] also finds that FDI depends on industry as well as host-country characteristics and
stronger IPR protection tends to induce high-quality FDI.
New technologies can be divided into two groups by their legal status, technical secrets (know-hows)
and patents. Within license relationship, the licensor must disclose his technical secrets to the licensee,
so the later is the most potential imitator. Ethier and Markusen (1996) and Markusen (2001) adopted
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a two-stage framework assuming that an MNE hires a local agent in host country, which learns the
technology in the first period and can defect to start a rival firm in the second period. The MNE can
similarly dismiss the agent at the beginning of the second period and hire a new agent. But for patents,
the imitator may be a third party. Firms are required technical disclosure when applying patents, so the
third party outside a licensing relationship can learn the technology by reading patent literature. In this
paper, I focus on the case of patent imitation in host country, assuming that when an MNE enters the
host country by means of either direct investment or licensing, there is a potential third party imitator.
IPR protection is modeled simply as the scale of punishment imposed on the third party imitator.
As far as I know, the existing literature have two major shortcomings. On the one hand, few
of the literature above explore the impact of complexity on the relationship between IPR
protection and FDI. Theoreticly, complexity may take effect by means of imitation cost: higher
complexity means higher imitation cost. Mansfield (1994, 1995) show that the concern about the IPR
regime depends on the purpose of an investment project. Obviously, investments in manufacturing
components and complete products (where about 80 percent of survey respondents were concerned about
IPR protection) are much more complex than sales and distribution outlets (where the percentage is only
about 20).
On the other hand, few of the literature above explore the impact of MNEs’ investment
motivation on this relationship. There is significant difference between cost-oriented and market-
oriented FDI. For cost-oriented one, the MNEs are seeking low productive cost in host country. The
R&D stage is put in home country in which high skill R&D staff are available and R&D activities are
more close to their customers, and manufacturing and assembling stage in low-cost host country. So
MNEs have to determine the way they obtain products from host country: direct invest and then obtain
by intra-firm trade or import from independent exporter (the licensee) from host country by arm’s-length
trade. For market-oriented FDI, more R&D activities are put in host country where they are close to
local customers. Given the cost advantage of host country, MNEs also have to determine the way they
access host market: investing directly in host country and then produce goods locally or licensing to a
host partner.
Motived by above literature and facts, this paper investigates following questions theoretically: (i)
how indutrial characteristics, especially the complexity of production, impact the effect of IPR protection
on MNEs’ investment decision; (ii) is there any difference between the reflection of market-oriented and
cost-oriented direct investment decision against host IPR protection; (iii) how the other institutional
elements, contracting institutions for example, effect the MNEs entry mode choice between FDI and
licensing. The model developed in this study is based on many relating theoretical studies. Antràs and
Helpman (2006)[1] developed a headquarter services-intermediate input model to study the impact of
contractual frictions on MNE’s outsourcing or vertical integration choice. Based on a simplified Antràs
and Helpman (2006) model, Carluccio and Fally (2012)[5] incorporated capital market frictions on the
supplier’s side, and analyzed MNE’s global sourcing activety under imperfect capital markets. Based on
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their work, complexity is embodied into the model of this paper, showing that strengthening of host IPR
protection can induce larger amount of higher complexity and market-oriented MNEs’ investment.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the basic model; Section 3 discusses
the impact of IPR protection, complexity, competitiveness and motivation of investment on imitation
and MNEs’ welfare; Section 4 concludes.
2 Framework
Consider a world comprised of three regions: the developed North H (home country of MNE), the
developing South (potential host country) S, and the third developed country T . Labor cost is higher
in the North and the third country than that in the South. IPR protection is strong in the North and
the third country, but weak in the South. Consumers of each country consuming a set of varieties prefer
diversified and highly complex goods. There are many producers in each country. Firms from the North
can sell goods in home market and/or in foreign market, transportation cost is set to be zero, but firms
from the South and the third country are assumed to sell only in local market.
To sell goods in foreign market, firm J from the North can either: (i) invest and performing production
directly in the South or license his patent to a local firm to sale goods in host market, in this case, the MNE
is performing market-oriented internationalization; or (ii) invest and performing production directly in
the South but sales goods produced to the third country T, and in this case, the MNE is performing
cost-oriented internationalization to take advantage of low labor cost in the South. And in each case,
there is a potential imitator in the host country (noting that the IPR protection is weak in host country).
In this section, complexity is incorporated into utility and production function, so that I can analyze its
impact on MNE’s FDI decision-making later.
2.1 Consumption
Consumers prefer diversified consumption. Their preferences are identical and a representative consumer
chooses instantaneous expenditure E(τ) to maximize utility at time t:
U =
ˆ ∞
t
e−ρ(τ−t) logD(τ)dτ
subject to the intertemporal budget constraint
ˆ ∞
t
e−r(τ−t)E(τ)dτ =
ˆ ∞
t
e−r(τ−t)I(τ)dτ +A(t)
for all t, where ρ denotes the rate of time preference; r the nominal interest rate; I(τ) instantaneous
income; and A(t) the current value of assets. The instantaneous utility D(τ) is given by
D(τ) = D
[(ˆ n
0
θ(j)αq(j)αdj
)] 1
α
(1)
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where q(j) is the consumption of good j, n the number of varieties available and 0 < α < 1 a measure
of substitutability, θ(j) reflects the complexity of good j1. The consumer has "taste for variety" in that
he or she prefers to consume a diversified bundle of goods, and also prefers higher complexity goods2.
Under the above assumption, the comsumer’s optimization problem can be broken down into two
stages. First, he chooses how to allocate a given spending level across all available goods. Second, he
chooses the optimal time path of spending. The elasticity of substitution between any two varieties j1
and j2 is
σ1,2 =
1
1− α −
d ln [θ(j2)/θ(j1)]
d ln [p(j1)/p(j2)]
Each firm can choose its investment level in R&D to achieve a certain complexity level and maximize
its profit. Given symmetrical firms, firms will choose a same R&D and complexity level, i.e. for any two
varieties j1 and j2, θ(j1) = θ(j2), and this will introduce a constant elasticity of substitution, so formula
(1) becomes a CES utility function, and the elasticity of substitution is then σ = 11−α . Given consumer’s
total expenditure E, the demand for any good j is
q(j) =
Ep(j)−σ
θ(j)P 1−σ
(2)
where p(j) is the price of good j and P a price index such that
P =
[ˆ n
0
θ(j)−1p(j)1−σdj
] 1
1−σ
(3)
Formula (3) shows that given a large amount of diversified products, a single producer’s pricing
strategy has approximately no effect on the common price index P , so A = Eθ(j)P 1−σ can be regarded as
constant. But if there are only a small number of varieties, a single producer’s strategy has significent
impact on P . For simplicity, n is regarded large enough and the case of small number of varieties will
be discussed later.
2.2 Production
Assuming that a firm produces and sales only one variety. The final goods are made of intermediate
goods. Producing one unit of final good needs one unit of intermediate good and no other inputs needed,
i.e. q(j) = m(j). The firm needs to undertake a continuum of tasks (normalized to one) to produce the
intermediate good. Each task can be taken to be the production of a single component or procedure of the
intermediate good. Tasks are distributed evenly in [0, 1]. Following Carluccio (2012)[5], the production
technology is assumed to be represented by a CES function where tasks are imperfectly substitutable.
To be more precisely
1The complexity of good is defined as the fraction of complex tasks input in production, see subsection 2.2.
2For the popose of simplicity, suppose that all varieties have the same price p and are therefore consumed in equal
amounts q, the utility function can be recalled as U = n
1
ρ (θq), we can see that utility is increasing in n and θ.
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q(j) = m(j) =
(ˆ 1
0
kα
′
i di
) 1
α′
(4)
where ki denotes the tasks input in producing intermediate goods, 11−α′ is referred to the elasticity of
substitution. For the sake of argument, assuming that the elasticity of substitution between tasks is the
same as it is between final goods (α = α′), producing a simple linear form for the value of total sales.
There are two types of tasks: basic and complex ones. A task is regarded as basic one when it is
performed using public technology, for a single firm, the cost of basic task is given due to competitive
market. Contrary to basic tasks, complex tasks are specific and are performed using exclusive technol-
ogy3, i.e. patents and know-hows. Performing complex tasks needs exclusive equipment and skill, so the
cost of complex task is higher than basic one, and the total cost arises as the complexity increases. Let
θ denote the fraction of complex tasks required during production. θ can be regarded as a parameter of
good complexity4. Total cost of intermediate good is then
TC = Cf +m(j)c+ γθ(j)m(j)c = Cf + [1 + γθ(j)]m(j)c (5)
where Cf is fixed cost, c the unit cost of tasks, γθ(j)c the marginal cost related to exclusive technology
(complexity specific cost hereinafter), and γ (γ > 0) reflects positive correlation between complexity and
unit cost. Cost function (5) shows that firms benefit from economies of scale.
2.3 Cross-border License and Direct Investment
To sell his product in the South market, a North firm J have many alternative ways, including exporting,
establishing joint venture with local partners, establishing wholly owned subsidiaries and licensing to local
partners. Dunning’s eclectic OLI framework shows that firm choice among several internationalization
mode, including exporting, licensing, and direct investment, is determined by firms advantages pattern
of ownership, location and internalization. There has been rich literature documenting MNEs’ choice
between exporting and FDI, Melitz (2003)[26] argues that only the firms with high productivity can
export, Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004)[16] extended his work to show that only the firms with
highest productivity can sell products in host market via FDI, firm with higher productivity can export,
and low productivity firm can only serve home market. For sake of argument, I only consider two of
these MNEs’ entering mode, license and direct investment.
3Carluccio (2012) regards complex tasks specific and cannot be fully described in a contract in order to link characteristics
of production with imcomplete contracts.
4Here complexity in production induces better customer experience, (see utility function (1)), so consumers is willing to
pay higher price for more complex goods, but higher complexity induces higher cost. So firms must consider the trade-off
between high cost and high price.
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2.3.1 Cross-border License
Two important dimensions of local institutions, contracting institution and (intellectual) property rights
protection, both can effect MNE’s operation. In vertical relationship, incomplete contacts are usually
caused by relationship-specific investment and contractibility of tasks5. Contracting issues between
licenser and licensee are usually related to information asymmetry and moral hazard caused by it. As
discussed by Markusen (1995)[22], the potential licensee has superior information, usually about how the
product will sell in its local market. The licensor can mitigate contractual hazards by payment structure
(Cebrián, 2009[6]) and supervision activities. When information asymmetry and low penalty exists, the
licensee will be tempted to abuse patent technology to maximize his own profit, for example, the licensee
can state that not all of the products produced under license are sold out in order to lessen royalty fee he
should pay. The proportion that the licensee is willing to hide can be seen as a parameter of contracting
institution quality6. So improvement of contracting institution may raise the licenser’s (the MNE’s)
income and profit.
Consider the case that there is no potential imitator but a weak contracting institution in the South
country. When firm J enters the host market by licensing his patent to a local partner S (the licensee),
he firstly bargain over the division of the revenue with potential local partner7. Let β denote the fraction
the licensor obtains and (1 − β) the licensee obtains. Given weak contracting institution in the host
country and opportunism on the licensee’s side, the local partner has motivation to hide a fraction of
(1−h) he produced. Due to information asymmetry and low deterrent of the court, local partner is more
opportunistic than ones in MNE’s home country, in which the contractual institution is assumed perfect.
So the local partner can declare that the quantity produced is only a fraction of h, and the other (1−h)
is lost, he would only pay royalty for the remaining h. The local partner determines the optimal output
quantity to maximize his profit:
ΠS = (1− βh)R− (1 + γθ)qc
where R denotes total sales revenue, cf the fixed cost (assume that it is equal to the cost that production
performed in home country by firm J himself), Given the CES demand, the local partner’s optimal
supply is
q∗S =
A
θ
(
(1 + γθ)c
α(1− βh)
)−σ
(6)
Plug formula (6) into (2), we can get the optimal price charged by local licensee and maximized profit
5Antràs and Helpman (2006) studies the effects of changes in the quality of contracting institutions on the relative
prevalence of integration and outsourcing.
6In existing literature, there are different definations on contractual institution. Antràs and Helpman (2006) regards it
as the fraction of contractible produciong activities, Markusen (2001)[23] measure the contract enforcement as the scale of
a penalty that the defecting party must pay.
7Royalties are typically agreed upon as a percentage of gross or net revenues derived from the use of intellectual property
or a fixed price per unit sold of an item of such. None of these measures can completely remove local partner’s opportunism
behavior.
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of him:
p∗ =
(1 + γθ)c
α(1− βh) (7)
Π∗S = (1− α)(1− βh)
A
θ
(
(1 + γθ)c
α(1− βh)
)1−σ
− Cf (8)
Firm J ’s profit under license ΠJ,L = βhR is then
Π∗J,L = βh
A
θ
(
(1 + γθ)c
α(1− βh)
)1−σ
(9)
Formula (6) to (9) shows that strengthening of local contracting institution (the decline of hidden
fraction (1 − h)) will make the local producer supply less in order to maximize his own profit. But is
effect on firm J ’s profit is not clear. On the one hand, it raise the fraction the MNE get from unit output,
on the other hand, it reduces the volume the licensee produces. the final result is determined by the net
effect of these two aspects.
2.3.2 Direct Investment
Instead of entering the foreign market by licensing, firm J can invest directly in host country and serve
local market directly. Generally, MNE can either establish a joint venture with local partner or establish
a wholly owned enterprise. The controlling power of MNEs differs across these entering modes. An
MNE has full control on solely owned foreign subsidiary but have least control in licensing, while joint
venture is of compromising control. In this paper, only the extreme cases, i.e., licensing and solely
owned foreign subsidiary (FDI hereinafter) are discussed. When an MNE enter host market by direct
investment, it can be seen as he "buys" a local partner in host country. As shown in Grossman and Hart
(1986)[12] and Hart and Moore (1990)[14], integration does not eliminate the opportunistic behavior of
the local partner. For the sake of simplicity, it is assumed that the subsidiary can only produce a fraction
δ ∈ (0, 1) of the amount of q(j) produced in the case that the local partner fully cooperates. The MNE
determines it’s optimal investment to maximize his profit E (ΠJ,V ) = βDR− [cf + (1 + γθ) q(j)c], where
βD = δ
α + β(1− δα) > β. The optimal price charged by the MNE and his optimal supply are
p∗J,D =
(1 + γθ) c
αβD
(10)
q∗J,D =
A
θ
(
(1 + γθ) c
αβD
)−σ
(11)
respectively. Firm J ’s profit under FDI ΠJ,D = βDR− (1 + γθ)qc is then
Π∗J,D = (1− α)βD
A
θ
(
(1 + γθ)c
αβD
)1−σ
− Cf (12)
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3 IPR Protection and Imitation
Ethier and Markusen (1996)[9] and Markusen (2001)[24] document a highly simple two-period model in
which the MNE wishes exploit a technology in a foreign market by licensing a local partner or by setting
up a subsidiary. The licensee masters the technology in the first period and can defect to start a rival firm
in the second period. The MNE can also defect to license a third partner. But the imitator of know-hows
and patents may be different, because know-hows are technological secrets, commonly one can not know
it before entering a licensing agreement with the inventor, a patent is a set of exclusive rights granted by
a sovereign state to an inventor or their assignee for a limited period of time, in exchange for the public
disclosure of the invention. One can get to know how to manufacture using a patented technology, but
not being permitted to do so before licensed by the owner of the patent. So an potential imitator of
patents may be the licensee or a third person. In this paper, I will focus on the case of a third person,
i.e., the potential imitator sets up a rival firm.
The way that IPR protection affect MNE’s operation is that strenghening of IPR protection decrease
imitation in host country. In Grossman and Helpman (1991)[10], imitation is taken as a costly activity8.
Mansfield, et al. (1981)[21] shows that in a sample of firms in four industries, average imitation costs
totaled some 65 percent of innovation costs and imitation time equaled about 70 percent of innovation
time (see also Maskus (2000)[25]). Branstetter et al. (2007)[3], following Grossman and Helpman (1991),
has the same assumption. In reality, imitation is not only costly, but also is related to industrial char-
acteristics. Maskus (2000)[25] points out that imitation cost is not symmetric across industries. Patent
protection is seen more critical for inventions in pharmaceuticals, agricultural and industrial chemicals
and biotechnology, because these industries embody high costs of R&D but imitation costs are very low,
competitors can easily determine the molecular composition of pharmaceutical compounds or the genetic
makeup of biotechnological inventions. In this study, imitation cost is assumed to be endogenously de-
termined by complexity, i.e., it is a fraction of original complexity specific cost, and the fraction varies
across industries.
3.1 Complexity Ceiling of Imitation
Assuming that there is a potential imitator in host country when firm J enters the South market either
by means of licensing or direct investment. The imitation cost is in the same form of complexity specific
cost , but is much lower, namely a η1(j) ∈ (0, 1] fraction of it and η1(j) reflects the difficulty of imitation9.
Unlike Grossman and Helpman (1991)[11] and Branstetter et al.,[3], in which imitation cost is endoge-
nously determined by capital accumulation and quantity produced in host country (in order to analyze
knowledge spillovers for the South), imitation cost here is assumed to be endogenously determined by
complexity.
8Helpman (1993) noted that "...imitation is an economic activity much the same as innovation; it requires resources and
it responds to economic incentives...".
9The variety index j will be omitted hereinafter.
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Not all imitation activity is profitable, the imitator responds to IPR protection judicature in host
country. Two fundamental dimension of this judicature is probability of punishment and the scale of
penalty. More precisely, assuming that the imitator will be punished for infringement at the probability
of  ∈ (0, 1]. If  = 1, any infringement will be punished. When the imitator is punished, he will be
charged a penalty of φq(j)c, i.e. a fraction of his variable cost. So Φ = φ can be regarded as a parameter
of IPR protection intensity, higher Φ means stronger IPR protection. All penalties are assumed to be
paid to the court, so they can not be taken as potential income for an MNE10.
Total cost and profit function of an imitator I is then TCI = Cf + (1 + η1(j)γθ + Φ) qc and ΠI =
R − [Cf + (1 + η1γθ + Φ) qc]. Resolving the imitator’s optimizing problem, we can get the imitator’s
optimal price and optimal supply
p∗I =
(1 + η1γθ + Φ) c
α
(13)
q∗I =
A
θ
(
(1 + η1γθ + Φ) c
α
)−σ
(14)
respectively. Note that −σ = − 11−α < 0, so the optimized supply of imitator declines in the IPR
protection index Φ.
Proposition 1. Strengthening of IPR protection and increasing of complexity will decrease imitator’s
expected profit and inhibit imitaton in host country.
Proof. Plug the imitator’s optimal price and optimal supply into his profit function, we can get the
imitator’s expected pofit
E(Π∗I) =
(1− α)A
θ
(
(1 + Φ + η1γθ) c
α
)1−σ
− cf (15)
Make derivation to formula (16) yields:
∂E(Π∗I)
∂Φ
= −A
(
(1 + Φ + η1γθ) c
α
)−σ
and
∂E(Π∗I)
∂θ
= −A
η1γθ
(
(1+Φ+η1γθ)c
α
)−σ
+ σ−1
(
(1+Φ+η1γθ)c
α
)1−σ
θ2
Note that
(
(1+Φ+η1γθ)c
α
)
> 0, so ∂Π
∗
I
∂Φ < 0 and
∂E(Π∗I )
∂θ < 0, E(ΠI) declines in the IPR protection index
Φ and complexity index θ, showing that strengthening of IPR protection and increasing of complexity
will decrease imitator’s expected profit.
Proposition 2. (Complexity Ceiling Effect) There exists a unique complexity threshold θ¯ above which,
10In practice of IPR judicature, the complaint party may ask for penalties for compensation, but potential penalty income
can hardly treated as (a part of) determination(s) for an MNE’s entering stratagy.
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a variety will not be imitated in the South. This threshold decreases as (1) host IPR protection being
strengthened; and/or (2) the imitating difficulty (η1) arising.
Proof. The condition of an imitator in host country enters the market is non-zero profit. Formula (12)
implies that the imitation condition is
θ¯ =
αc−1
(
A−1σcf
) 1
1−σ − Φ− 1
η1γ
(16)
This implies not only the unique complexity threshold exists, but also it decrease in IPR protection
index Φ and imitation difficulty index η1. so as the IPR protection is strengthen, only those less complex
goods will be imitated in the South.
When there are large number of varieties, the common price index P will not be affected by a
single imitator’s pricing strategy, the demand the firm J facing is then not affected by it (noting that
q(j) = Ep(j)
−σ
θ(j)P 1−σ = Ap(j)
1−σ, A is constant in case of large number of varieties). Proposition 1. and
Proposition 2. indicate that given IPR protection index in host country, varieties of which complexity
are above θ¯ will not be imitated, as Figure 3 shows.
Figure 3: IPR Protection and Imitation Complexity Ceiling
Figure 3 also shows that when host IPR protection strengthened, this complexity threshold will be
smaller, so that the number of varieties threatened by imitation will be smaller. This will encourage more
MNEs allocate high complex production into host country. As the industry-vary imitating difficulty has
impact on imitating cost, given IPR protection level, in industries with different imitating difficulty, the
thresholds are also varies. Assuming that there are two industries, 1 and 2, and η11 < η21 (which means
that imitating cost is higher in industry 1 than that in industry 2). Figure 3 shows that the threshold
of industry 2 is lower that industry 1.
Obviously, given host IPR protection level, relative to those of lower complexity and lower imitation
cost, varieties of higher complexity and higher imitation cost are unlikely to be imitated. What’s more,
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stronger IPR protection can be seen as complement to low complexity and/or low imitation cost. As
discussed by Maskus (2000), industries like pharmaceuticals, agricultural and industrial chemicals and
biotechnology embody high costs of R&D, but competitors can easily get to know the molecular com-
position of pharmaceutical compounds or the genetic makeup of biotechnological inventions. So firms of
these industries are very sensitive to host IPR protection when investing there. Strengthening of IPR
protections can reduce the number of potential imitators, and make the host country more attractive to
MNEs.
3.2 Impact of Competiveness
As mentioned above, the number of varieties, or competitiveness, matters. Given large amount of
variaties, imitation has little effect on MNE’s profit. In a more generalized case, considering a relatively
small amount of variaties, in which imitation has impact on the MNE’s profit by affecting the common
price index P .
To intuitively illustrate the impact of competiveness on price index, I assume that there are very
small difference among firms’ productivity, and firms are descending arranged by productivity from 0 to
n. So the prices charged by these firms are ascending arranged in (0,1). Price charged by the imitator
is then assumed to be slightly lower than the firm which has the least productivity but is slightly higher
than the firm which has the second least productivity. Now, it is easy to understand that the entrance
of imitator (i) will crowd out the firm which has the lowest productivity. Let P the price index without
imitation and Pi the price index with imitation. The differece betwenn Pi and P is
∆P = Pi − P =
[ˆ n−1
0
θ−1p(j)1−σdj + θ−1p(i)1−σ
] 1
1−σ
−
[ˆ n
0
θ−1p(j)1−σdj
] 1
1−σ
(17)
As the price charged by the imitator is much lower, p(i) < p(n), it is intuitive that Pi is lower that
P . The entrance of imitator lower the common price index. Note that the MNE’s profit either in case
of licensing or FDI decreases in P (see formula (12) and (15)), so the entrance of local imitator
makes the MNE worse off. As shown in formula (9), local imitator will charge higher price when
IPR protection strengthened, so strengthening of IPR protection increase MNE’s profit.
Proposition 3. In the case of small number of variety, strengthening of IPR protection makes the MNE
better-off in general, but MNEs producing medium complexity variety benefit most.
Proof. Plug A = EθP 1−σ into MNE’s profit equation under license (formula (9)), we can get
Π∗J,L =
Ehβ
θ2P 1−σ
(
(1 + γθ)c
α(1− βh)
)1−σ
(18)
Formula (9) shows that the MNE’s profit is strictly decreasing in common price index P . Formula
(18) implies that the entrance of an imitator induces lower P , so strengthening of IPR protection will
make MNEs better-off by remove threat of imitation or lower price charged by potential imitator.
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Figure 4 demonstrates the patterns of effect of IPR protection on MNE’s profit. At beginning, IPR
protection index of host country is Φ0 and the complexity threshold of imitation is then θ¯0. MNEs with
complexity arranging from 0 to θ¯0 are threatened by imitation, but those with complexity above θ¯0 have
enough immunity from imitation.
Figure 4: Effect of IPR Protection on MNE’s Profit
As IPR protection strengthened, i.e., Φ0 → Φ1, the complexity threshold of imitation goes down to
θ¯1. MNEs with complexity above θ¯0 still have immunity from imitation. There is no change for these
MNEs. MNEs with complexity arranging from θ¯1 to θ¯0 will be better-off since the imitators have been
removed by strengthened IPR protection. MNEs with complexity arranging from 0 to θ¯1 will be better-
off as well, but not so notable as those arranging θ¯1 to θ¯0. Because, imitation is till possible, in spite of
lower prices charged by imitators and a higher common price index P .
3.3 Cost-Oriented FDI and Processing Trade
Instead of entering the host country for access local market (market-oriented FDI), some multinational
firms enter host country to ultralize local abundant labor force and export products to home or third
foreign markets. In other words, the produts produced in host country are not designed for local market.
Two terms are related to this sort of strategy: export-platform FDI and processing trade. Export-platform
FDI is generally defined as investment and production in a host country where the output is largely sold
in third markets, not the parent or host-country markets. An MNE enter the host country for abundant
and low-wage labor, so it is cost-oriented FDI. For example, US firms investment in Ireland to serve
the integrated EU and Ireland is chosen as the low-cost location, Mexico is also chosen as the low-cost
location by EU firms to serve the integrated North American market. Econometric analysis of Hanson
et al., (2001)[13] suggests that export platform FDI is promoted by low host-country trade barriers
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and discouraged by large host-country markets11. Processing trade refers to the business activity of
importing all or part of the raw and auxiliary materials, parts and components, accessories, and packaging
materials from abroad in bond, and re-exporting the finished products after processing or assembly by
enterprises within the mainland. It includes processing with supplied materials and processing with
imported materials.
A common feature of export-platform FDI and processing trade is that the variaty produced in host
country are not designed for local market, a host firm who imitates and sells this kind of variaty in the
South has to burden extra cost to redesign for local customers. I assume the extra cost have same form
with complexity specific cost and denoted by η2. Consider a single kind of product u which the MNE
produces in the South country and exported to the North. The imitator’s profit is then
E(Πˆ∗I) =
(1− α)A
θ
(
[1 + Φ + (η1 + η2)γθ]c
α
)1−σ
− cf (19)
and this profit is lower than that of a good designed for host country. In this case, the non-imitating
threshold of complex will be lower, i.e. θˆ(Φ) < θ¯(Φ), as shown in Figure 5.
Figure 5: Imitation Ceiling for Cost-oriented Production
And the optimal price charged by the imitator is then
pˆ∗I =
[1 + (η1 + η2)γθ + Φ]c
α
(20)
and this price is higher than that of a good designed for host country. This will make the price index
P higher, and the MNE’s profit will be larger, so given the IPR protection intensity, the MNEs tend to
put cost-oriented production to the South than that of market-oriented.
11See comprahensive theoretical analysis by Ekholm et, al. (2003)[8].
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4 Concluding Remarks
As the fragmentation of production grows and MNEs global activities expended, large amount of FDI
flowed to emerging markets. BRICs, especially China, are most important host countries. Two features
are remarkable. On one hand, IPR protection remains very low in these host countries while existing
literature show that IPR protection generally have positive effect on FDI inflow. On the other hand,
remarkable fraction of investments exacuted by MNEs in emerging coutries are vertical integration: they
are seeking abundent and low-wage labor instead of large local market, and generally operating in low
complexity (and also low value-added) production processes. Existing literature has not given convincing
theoretical explanation yet.
By inducing complexity into Dixit-Stiglitz (1977)[7] model with a CES production function (in order to
allow a simultaneous consideration of effects of IPR protection and industrial characteristics), this paper
theoreticly link IPR protection, complexity and MNE’s FDI decision on firm-level. Key assumptions
in this study are: (1) imitition is a costly activity and imitation costs vary across industries; (2) local
imitator burden relatively higher imitation cost when imitating a product only designed for foreign
market than the product designed for host market.
The first main conclusion is that strengthening of host IPR protection will make MNEs more willing to
invest directly in host country or license his patent to local producer. Stronger IPR protection encourage
FDI and licensing in two ways. First strengthening IPR protection increases MNE’s potential penalty
income as a compensation to local licensee’s hidden behavior caused by weak contracting institution and
outcome loss caused by local partner’s opportunism behavior. Second, the entrance of imitator lower
the common price index, makes the MNE worse off. Local imitator will charge higher price when IPR
protection strengthened, so strengthening of IPR protection increase MNE’s profit. This effect is stronger
when the number of varieties is small.
The second main conclusion is that strengthening of host IPR protection will make MNEs invest in
higher complexity sectors or license higher complexity patents to host partners. Imitation cost is assumed
a fraction of "complexity specific cost", there is a complexity ceiling for a certain set of varieties. This
means that there is a θ¯ above which a variety can not be imitated. This θ¯ declines as IPR protection
intensity index Φ increase. So as the host country’s IPR protection is strengthened, more imitation
threats to high complexity but low imitation cost varieties are eliminated, and more MNEs producing
these varieties will enter the host country.
The last conclusion is that cost-oriented FDI (or export-platform FDI) is less sensitive to host IPR
protection than market oriented FDI. Varieties the MNE products by cost-oriented FDI are not designed
for host market, so local imitator has to burden extra imitation cost to to redesign for local customers,
and therefore charge a relatively higher price than varieties originally designed for local market, hurts to
MNEs are also smaller. This may be the reason why low IPR protected emerging host countries received
larger amount of foreign direct investment that performing processing trade and manufacturing products
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solely for exporting.
The conclusions above have explicit policy implications for China. China is one of the most largest
FDI recipients in last twenty years. But it is frequently criticized that a large fraction of the foreign
invested enterprises are performing processing trade or producing only for export. These products are
less complexity and low value-added, the spill-over is also scare because the industrial linkage between
these firms and local industries are weak. This study shows that enhance IPR protection can encourage
market-oriented FDI and induce more MNEs producing high complexity varieties in China.
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